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Abstract 
An increased focus on the concept of resilience in flood protection has led to the development of a comprehensive flood 
protection strategy in the Netherlands which stresses the need to provide ‘Room for the River’ rather than building dykes. But 
how can a resilient solution in flood protection be successfully implemented? Using insights from the major Dutch flood-
protection project ‘Room for the River’, this article studies the governance of resilience. From a political perspective, resilience is 
often a win-lose game with many uncertainties. The actors involved have strong incentives to exploit these uncertainties and to 
hamper resilience based policies. The ‘Room for the River’-project was based upon the idea of resilience and had a win-lose 
character. Nevertheless, the many actors involved, with their conflicting interests, managed to reach consensus by broadening the 
agenda and by making flood protection a multi-issue game.  
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Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of Stevens Institute of Technology. 
Keywords: resilience;governance;water management;flood protection  
1. Introduction 
Rising sea levels, melting glaciers and more extreme weather conditions mean that flood protection is once again 
high on the agenda in many countries. In this context, the concept of ‘resilience’ is frequently applied. Apart from a 
focus on ex ante measures, flood protection and water management in general increasingly incorporates the issue of 
how resilient systems and societies are in their response to flooding.  
Often, the concept of ‘resilience’ is interpreted in a purely technical sense, the central question being how a 
technical or physical system can be made resilient. However, resilience also involves an important governance 
component. How can a resilient solution in flood protection be successfully implemented? In this paper, we argue 
that the resilience concept has specific characteristics which warrants a more thorough assessment of the governance 
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of resilience, more specifically the ‘politics of resilience’. This focus on the implication of resilient responses has 
received little attention in academic contributions. We will discuss a major Dutch flood-protection project that was 
based on the idea of resilience, and our main focus will be on the governance aspects, in particular the relation 
between resilience and governance.  
2. Resilience and the politics of resilience 
2.1. The ‘resilience’ concept explored 
Before we turn to the issue of governance of resilience, we will first pay attention to ‘resilience’. Resilience is 
derived from the Latin word resilio, meaning ‘to jump back’.1,2 In essence, resilience assumes that disturbances 
occur, but can be absorbed or ‘controlled’. Consequently, resilience refers to the capability for stabilization after a 
disturbance has occurred. As such, resilience is the antitheses of the concept of anticipation, which seeks ‘to predict 
and prevent potential dangers before damage is done’.3 Whereas anticipation is particularly effective in preventing 
from specific threats, resilience is more effective as uncertainty, dynamics and volatility increase. 
However, the term resilience is not that easily operationalized. Application of the concept in different scientific 
contexts has highlighted different aspects of stability. In physics and engineering, resilience refers to ‘the ability of a 
material to return to its former shape after a deformation’4 and is considered more or less synonymous to 
adaptability or flexibility.5 But in social science research, where resilience is applied to the behaviour of humans, 
organizations or social contexts, resilience refers to the ‘ability to resist disorder’6, ‘to continue its existence, or to 
remain more or less stable, in the face of surprise, either a deprivation of resources or a physical threat.’7  
In short, different scientific disciplines attribute different meanings to resilience and use the concept to denote 
different elements of stability. The first to acknowledge this fundamental difference was ecologist Holling, who 
identified engineering resilience and ecological resilience as distinctive types with distinctive characteristics.8
Whereas the first notion of resilience focuses on ‘efficiency, constancy and predictability’ and the ‘efficiency of 
function’, ecological resilience focuses on ‘persistence, change and unpredictability’, maintaining the ‘existence of 
function.’9 Whereas engineering resilience assumes a return of a system to its former stable state after a disturbance 
as quickly as possible either via the speed of the recovery process or the reduction of the impact, ecological 
resilience assumes the possibility that a system can return to a ‘stable’ state that does not resemble the original stable 
state, as can been seen in Fig. 1.  
     Figure 1. Engineering resilience (A) versus Ecological resilience (B) 
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Source: Gunderson, LH. Adaptive dancing: interactions between social resilience and ecological crises. In Berkes, F, Colding, J, Folke, C, 
editors. Navigating Social-Ecological Systems, Building resilience for complexity and change. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press;2003.p.35.  
In some disciplines the ecological resilience concept has evolved to also encompass ‘the interplay of disturbance 
and reorganization within a system as well as […] transformability, learning and innovation, i.e., social-ecological 
resilience’.10 With this shift the importance within the resilience concept of the role of humans and their behavior 
increases and therefore the focus migrates to a higher level of institutions and governance structures increases 
relative from more instrumental and more detailed measures.11
The recognition of the existence of different forms of resilience is no mere academic exercise. Its importance 
cannot be overestimated when studying the real-world implementation of resilient solutions; in our case the 
governance processes of the first large-scale flood protection project in the Netherlands that made use of the 
concept.12 As we have already indicated, although resilience is most often defined in technical or physical terms, it 
also has a political dimension, which we refer to as the 'politics of resilience'. Although much attention is paid to 
resilience solutions in terms of technical solutions and physical systems, the key focus of our analysis is aimed at the 
governance level. Based upon our short theoretical exposé, a number of issues can be identified that would warrant 
increased attention towards the governance of resilience.  
2.2 Resilience: a wicked, contested concept 
First of all, the term resilience in practice is used by many different actors with widely diverging motives and 
interests, which tend to remain unarticulated. As a result, it is often unclear just what is meant by resilience. 
Furthermore, although the previous description of the concept might suggest conceptual clarity, just exactly how 
anticipation, engineering resilience and ecological resilience differ from each and relate to other remains unclear. In 
fact, the concept lacks a thorough empirical grounding leading some scholars to conclude that “[r]esilience has been 
used to describe the ability […] to absorb shocks in order to maintain a steady state, and also the ability to rebound 
back from shocks to a new steady state. At this rate, what isn’t resilience.”13 This becomes particularly problematic 
if the concept is applied to real world solutions, for example in flood protection projects:  
• A precise distinction between anticipation and resilience is problematic. For example, is a flood protection 
project that seeks to develop a more resilient capacity of areas which would allow more ‘Room for the River’ an 
example of anticipation (the prevention of a particular disturbance, in this case floods), or resilience (the project 
aspires a more flexible response than dikes would provide)? Or could programs even be considered as a hybrid 
phenomenon of part anticipation, part resilience?  
• In practice, most solutions in flood protection do not easily conform to the two ideal-types of resilience that were 
distinguished by Holling. Again, real-world solutions seem to offer complex, hybrid forms which constitute 
characteristics of both engineering and ecological resilience. The design of a technical system with elements of a 
‘defence in depth’ for example, or adjusted operations because technology can be employed in different ways 
over time. For example, the largest element in the famous Dutch Delta works, the 9km long Oosterscheldekering, 
which was primarily designed to protect areas from the sea is simultaneously used to manage water saleanation in 
the estuary it protects.  
2.3. Different types of resilience influence the knowledge position of stakeholders 
What are the consequences of these two types of hybridity for governance and decision making? 
If a resilience engineering perspective dominates in the envisioned design, the efficiency of function gains 
precedence. Then governance regimes would facilitate processes and behavior that would allow for the fastest return 
to a stable state; the current stable state. Actors with vested interests will benefit from this approach to resilience. 
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Solutions from a resilience engineering perspective ‘simply’ aim to reduce the impact and duration of the 
disturbance and return to the original stable state that existed before the disturbance. Although the actual processes 
to assess the impact of these interventions can be quite complex, they are nevertheless to a large extent quite 
predictable to stakeholders. This means that stakeholders can relatively easily assess the benefits and costs of 
proposed solutions for themselves as well as for other actors in the process. Engineering resilience therefore by and 
large produces situations where stakeholders are capable to assess the impact.  
This is much more difficult for actors when the resilient solution under consideration is more inclined towards 
ecological resilience. In these circumstances, the design of a resilient response that would actually allow for 
stabilization in new and different stable states, would produce two effects that would impact the capability of actors 
to assess the impact of these measures. First of all, actors will face more unpredictability in the assessment of the 
impact of a particular resilient response. Trying to assess such an impact and the possibilities of new stable states 
will be much harder and will leave decision makers with inherently more uncertainties about their own situation. 
Secondly, much more unpredictability will arise in the assessments of what the effect will be on the other actors. In 
short, a more ecologically resilient solution would result in a situation where actors are less capable to assess the 
impact of that solution in terms of costs and benefits for themselves as well as for others. The consequences of these 
effects for the governance of resilient programs are quite obvious.  
Although a solution that can be identified as resilient engineering solution could have costly and unpleasant 
effects, the more predictable, efficient solutions will be more or less be relatively straightforward to negotiate 
between actors. First of all because the solution more or less continues the current status quo. Furthermore, 
stakeholders can be more easily convinced of the overall systemic value of the solution as all stakeholders stand to 
gain from the improvement. Although sacrifices need to be made, all actors involved stand to gain from the 
proposed solution – a win-win situation.  
A solution with characteristics of ecological resilience will vastly reduce the capability of stakeholders to make 
accurate predictions about the effects of the solution, both for their own position as well as that of other 
stakeholders.  
To conclude, ecological resilience will result in more uncertainties for the actors involved. Uncertainty might 
evoke political resistance. Uncertainty about whether resilience is ‘engineering’ or ‘ecological’, might also evoke 
resistance. So both ‘ecological’ resilience and hybrid forms of resilience produce uncertainty and uncertainty might 
be an incentive for political resistance. In addition to this, the distinction between anticipation and resilience is also 
blurred. Many types of resilience are anticipated or planned. Planning for resilience with its inherent uncertainties is 
almost always a source of conflicts and politicization. 
2.4. Different types of resilience, win-lose games and the role of information 
The more akin the response is to ecological resilience, the more uncertainty enters the game; the possibility of 
hitherto unexplored stable states threatens the current status-quo and threatens power relations between stakeholders. 
Thus, one could expect solutions that might be characterized as ecologically resilient to more often result in a game 
of win-lose, having two variations:  
• One party receives ex ante protection, while the other party has to be resilient and therefore faces increased flood 
risk or; 
• There is a split incentive: one party invests in resilience (and bears the costs), and the other reaps the benefits 
(protection). 
Of course, this win-lose dimension will more often than not result in political conflicts, and have consequences 
for society's acceptance of resilience and impede political decision-making on the subject. If, in addition, winners 
and losers find themselves in a network of interdependencies – which is almost always the case in modern society – 
this can have an enormous impact on decision-making. The losers will attempt to block decision-making about 
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resilience; thanks to the aforementioned interdependencies they will often have the means or opportunity to do so. 
An important strategy in exercising the power to block progress is that of questioning the knowledge and 
information provided by experts. Of course, it is always possible to raise questions about how the danger was 
calculated, the protective effect of measures and the need for resilience as opposed to anticipation. The more 
contested this information is, the more legitimacy the parties have in their power to block progress. 
In summary, this is how the governance issues evolve: (1) resilience has its inherent uncertainties, (2) resilience 
requires anticipation and planning, (3) the introduction of resilience is often a win-lose game, (4) losers will apply 
their blocking power (5) and have strong incentives to ensure that knowledge and information is contested, (6) as a 
result of which the basis for resilience is undermined and their resistance is legitimized. In the next section, we will 
explore the consequences of this for the governance of a Dutch flood protection program. 
3. The case: The ‘Room for the River’ flood protection program 
3.1. Introduction; the need for an integrated system approach   
There are four major European rivers that flow through the Netherlands towards the sea: the Rhine, Maas, 
Schelde and Eems. This means that the Netherlands is situated in the delta of four rivers. Two of these deltas, those 
of the Rhine and the Maas, cut right across the Netherlands. If these rivers were to flood, this would strike at the 
heart of the Netherlands, resulting in significant damage and, potentially, large numbers of victims. 
River- and flood management of course requires an ‘integral’ or ‘systems’ perspective: policy analysts and policy 
makers should take the entire rivers and its functions into account, not just regional sections of the river or just the 
flood protection function. A systems perspective also means taking into account a large number of feedback and 
feed-forward mechanisms between the sub-systems (the sub-basins). Water from an upstream sub-basin flows into a 
downstream sub-basin. This determines the water level downstream. Surges in the water level downstream can in 
turn affect the water level upstream. There are many other forms of feedback. Building dykes can lead to an 
increased water flow downstream. Inhabitation can lead to a more rapid run-off of rainwater, but also to higher 
water levels because the cross section of the river is narrowed. The water level determines the use of the river 
(agriculture, shipping) and this in turn determines the water level. Interaction between catchment areas can be 
sequential and parallel. In all these mechanisms there are also uncertainties concerning precipitation, transport of 
clay and sand, and flood volumes.  
This article is not intended to give a detailed description of these system approaches. The assumption is that a 
system approach is inherent to flood management, but at the same time, a system approach is very difficult to 
implement from a governance perspective. A systems perspective means that many actors will have to be involved, 
with often conflicting interests. Inherent to a systems approach are its many uncertainties and disputable choices 
(system boundaries, data, methods etc.). As said in the conceptual section, an environment with conflicting interests 
will always know many incentives to exploit these uncertainties and disputable choices.  
3.2 Flood protection: the change of a policy paradigm 
The flood protection policy in the Netherlands has for a long time been based upon a simple and powerful 
paradigm: whenever the Netherlands felt insecure and unsafe, it heightened and strengthened its dikes. Of course, 
other additional measures were also taken, but dike construction and maintenance was the most important of these. 
As early as the 1980s and 1990s, though, experts began highlighting the fact that this dike strategy could not 
continue indefinitely. They drew attention to three key changes, which resulted in a change of the policy paradigm14:  
• Climate change will periodically lead to a great deal of rainfall upstream of the rivers, as a result of which large 
volumes of water will occasionally flow through the Netherlands, to a much greater extent than has been the case 
until now. 
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• The part of the Netherlands that is below sea level is gradually sinking to an even lower level, a phenomenon that 
is referred to as ‘settlement’ 
• Climate change results in a rise in sea levels, which makes it more difficult to pump the river water that flows in 
below sea level into the sea And so on 
Always responding to these changes simply by reinforcing the dike and increasing their height could actually be 
said to make the Netherlands intrinsically less safe. This strategy would require extremely high dikes, in view of the 
anticipated high water levels and ongoing settlement. The rivers wedged between these high dikes would need to 
deal with extreme water levels, as enormous masses of water would flow through the Netherlands. If, in that 
scenario, a dike should be breached, huge, unprecedented volumes of water would flow onto the land, with a high 
likelihood of much human suffering and major damage. 
The experts therefore called for a new paradigm – the project 'Room for the River' being the implementation of 
this paradigm. Whereas dikes constrict the river, hemming it in, Room for the River gives it space. Room for the 
River can manifest itself in the form of a broad range of concrete measures, including the following: 
• widening the riverbed, in other words shifting the dikes inland 
• excavating floodplains, making more cubic metres of space available for water 
• digging shortcuts that enable water to be drained quickly to the sea via an additional riverbed in the event of high 
water 
• building flood retention zones, which are polders along the river that are designed in such a way as to prevent 
major damage from occurring in the event of temporary flooding once every 10-25 years. The effect of this 
measure is to lower water levels. 
In the wake of two near-disasters in the mid-1990s, this Room for the River strategy was widely accepted, and it 
now forms an integral part of safety policy along the rivers.   
The construction of flood retention zones in particular can be seen as a shift from anticipation to resilience: 
whenever too much water flows through the rivers, polders are submerged in order to prevent the water levels in the 
rivers from rising too high. Is this ‘engineering’ or ‘ecological’ resilience? That might be uncertain: the impact of 
polders being submerged is hard to predict. Is this a complete shift from ‘anticipation’ to ‘resilience’? No, ‘Room 
for the River’ might be framed as ‘anticipated or planned resilience’.  
3.2. ‘Room for the River’: the politics of resilience 
In section 2, we explained that resilience is an intrinsically politically sensitive issue. What makes the ‘Room for 
the River’-project politically sensitive? What were the risks for the vice-minister of Infrastructures, who had to 
manage the decision making process and to collect enough measures to cope with the new normative inflow? 
Fragmentation 
The policy makers opted for a systems approach and carried out of study of more than 700 ‘Room for the River’ 
measures along the Rhine and the Maas, analyzing each of these measures in terms of their costs and their impact on 
water levels and safety. Inherent to this approach is that many political players were involved, with different 
interests. The two rivers are one system, but the political structure is fragmented: it is a patchwork of municipalities, 
regions, water boards and interests groups.  
Split incentive structure  
Many of these measures require actions to be taken in one location, but another location that gets the benefits: A 
flood zone needs to be created in one location (costs) in order to ensure that the dikes are not breached at a different 
location (benefits). In other words, the benefits and costs of measures impact on diverging locations. This is known 
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as the 'split incentive structure'. In the municipalities and regions responsible for bearing the cost of resilience (for 
example in the form of a flood zone), there will understandably be a lot of political and social unrest.  
Contested objective 
Before the introduction of the ‘Room for the River’-policy, the safety policy for the Rhine was based on a 
maximum inflow of water of 15,000 m3 per second on the border between the Netherlands and Germany. Experts 
had calculated that climate change made it necessary to increase this norm. They initially called for 16,000 m3, but 
in the light of worsening climate forecasts they eventually decided that an inflow of 18,000 m3 needed to be 
accommodated, and this was referred to as the ‘normative inflow’. 
Politicians often have difficulty in envisaging figures of this kind, but do have a sense of the consequences that 
these figures can have for measures that need to be taken along the rivers. In view of the substantial increase in the 
normative inflow, large-scale and potentially controversial measures were to be expected. This prospect can lead to 
a lot of potential resistance and a critical attitude towards the assumptions that formed the basis for the normative 
inflow that has been calculated.  
The figures may acquire more meaning for the politicians involved if they are placed in perspective. Not at any 
point during the near-floods of the mid-1990s was the rate of 15,000 m3 per second reached, although the volumes 
flowing into the Netherlands then were already considered extremely high. The highest water level ever measured 
was 15,700 m3 per second, in 1926. As a result, 18,000 m3 per second may well seem overly high or exaggerated to 
those public administrators who predict that this extra heightening of the dikes is likely to result in controversial 
projects. This can easily serve as an incentive to contest this objective and argue for a lower normative water level. 
Contested impact 
The split incentive structure can also serve as an incentive for politicians from the regions bearing the costs to 
contest the measures that affect them. For example, this may be by criticizing the positive impact anticipated for 
water safety or challenging the calculation of the costs. Politicians can commission agencies to conduct alternative 
calculations with different results. This can at the very least cause delays but also undermines the legitimacy of 
decision-making. 
Exceeding budgets and postponements 
Many projects are sizeable civil engineering projects. These kinds of projects can encounter all kinds of problems 
during implementation. Projects can easily exceed their budgets and realisation can incur serious delays. 
3.3. ‘Room for the River’: the decision making process 
Given these characteristics, the decision making process on the ‘Room for the River’ was perceived as a high risk 
process. To to what extent did these foreseeable problems actually materialise?   
Fragmentation and split incentive structure 
The most important question was how to deal with the split incentive structure and the social and political 
resistance that is inherent to it. Resilience is quite clearly a win-lose game and the losers therefore put up a great 
deal of resistance. 
The key strategy had two elements. First, the vice-minister broadened the agenda. She argued that the decision 
making process on the measures was not only about flood protection, but also on ‘spatial quality’, e.g. on tourism, 
harbor expansion, new forms of housing (on the water), the creation of new natural environments and new economic 
activities. 
Second, all the actors involved were invited to put issues on this very broad agenda. They came with all types of 
sometimes very specific issues. This proved to be a game-changer: the process shifted from a single-issue to a multi-
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issue game – in which implementing measures aimed at accommodating 18,000 m3 was merely part of the multi-
issue agenda. This transformation had five important effects: 
• It created incentives to take part in the process. It made it attractive for actors to take part in the process of 
negotiating about the measures to be taken. For these parties, the many other issues always involved some level 
of gain as well as some occasional pain. This meant that refusal to take part was not an option, as it would lead to 
decisions being made without them on issues of importance to them. 
• It created incentives for give-and-take. The multi-issue approach had a depoliticizing effect. Many parties were 
prepared to make concessions on one issue in return for compensation on other issues. Compared to politicians 
who did not show a willingness to contribute to accommodating the 18,000 m3, those who did show such 
willingness could also often count on more rewards with regard to other issues. 
• It created incentives for learning processes. The many different issues on the agenda also made new and unusual 
combinations possible. For example, one municipality wished to expand its tourist infrastructure. So what 
happened? Widening and deepening the harbor for pleasure craft also made a contribution towards 
accommodating the 18,000 m3. Numerous other combinations also emerged. 
• It created incentives for cooperative behavior. In the course of the process, ‘changing coalitions’ emerged – 
different coalitions of supporters and opponents for each issue. These changing coalitions created strong 
incentives for cooperative behavior. An actor’s opponent on issue A, proved to be a proponent on issues B, which 
forced this actor to behave moderately vis a vis this opponent. Put differently, the multi-issue game created 
interdependencies that compelled cooperative behavior. 
• Of course, it is not possible to get all parties on board: There was a number of parties who ultimately had to 
accept measures even though they were very much opposed to them. However, in the multi-issue process, a 
critical mass of ‘winners’ was created – parties who had emerged from the multi-game issue with an attractive 
package to show for it. At a certain point, it was in the interest of these parties that the decision-making process 
achieved closure, even if that also damaged the interests of a limited number of parties -- they were prepared to 
put these parties under pressure to accept their loss. 
 An example is the multi-issue game, played in the Overdiepse Polder. The Overdiepse Polder is one of the places 
where the river will be given more space. Thanks to the participation of local polder residents and farmers, several 
other issues were put on the agenda. As result of this, the outcome of the decision making process was not only a 
retention area, but also an economic restructuring (a number of farmers will build up a new existence elsewhere), a 
nature reserve,  a series of traditional, artificial hills that have a high position and will offer space to nine agricultural 
companies and a network of cycling paths. Another example is the Avelingen business area in the city of 
Gorinchem. ‘Room to the River’ has been linked to the redevelopment of this business area. A high water channel in 
the River Merwede will contribute to the accommodation of water, but also gives a boost to the development of this 
business area.  The channel will be deep enough for shipping and an extra container park could be constructed along 
the quayside. 
3.4. Contested objective 
The objective did indeed throw up questions and lead to discussion, but this discussion was conducted in an 
orderly and politically disciplined way. The ultimate solution was for the programme to be based on 16,000 m3 per 
second with measures already being taken to enable it to be upscaled quickly and easily to accommodate an inflow 
of 18,000 m3 per second. The political dexterity of the vice minister and the status of the institute that made the 
calculations for the objective certainly contributed to this. But equally important was the fact that the attractiveness 
of the multi-issue game meant that the incentive to contest the normative inflow disappeared. Investment was 
therefore made not so much in ensuring that the calculation of the normative inflow was as rigorous as possible, but 
in organising a multi-issue process, which meant that the precise calculation of the normative inflow was no longer 
an issue. 
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3.5. Contested impact 
The ministry quantified the impact of measures and created a visually attractive model, referred to as a 'box of 
building blocks' (‘blokkendoos’). This modelled the whole of the river zone and included some 700 measures. 
Within the model, it was possible to activate each measure and each combination of measures, immediately showing 
the impact on water levels, the likelihood of flooding and the total costs. In fact, it served as a decision-support 
system. But unlike many similar systems, local and regionals politicians and interest organisations did not feel that 
the solutions resulting from the system were more or less imposed on them. On the contrary, this box of building 
blocks made it possible to put together a large number of combinations of measures that all met the safety objectives 
and also remained within budget. Politicians did not, therefore, feel constricted by it: it actually gave them space in 
which to negotiate. Put another way, rather than directing the decision-making, expert knowledge facilitated it.   
3.6. Exceeding budgets and postponements 
In the end, the negotiations resulted in the selection of 39 measures from a list of 700 potential projects. In spite 
of the potential for controversy, widespread agreement was reached.  
In terms of implementation, the national government left the choice of the mode of implementation to parties at 
local level. If desired, the central government was willing to take over implementation. In that case, the risks, 
including those of a financial nature, would be borne by the central government. However, government authorities at 
lower levels were also allowed to indicate a willingness to take control of the project themselves. In that case, the 
central government made the budget available and the party at a local level was able to implement the project in its 
own way.  
The arrangement ensured that parties were able to seek roles in which they felt most comfortable. Put differently, 
every stakeholder involved could contribute according to its strengths and were motivated to do so. 
The result in the end was that the whole process appears to have been achieved within budget. The project was 
scheduled for completion in 2015. It now appears that two or three projects will be subject to some delay, but the 
others have or will be completed on time. This successful project management result is definitely related to the 
broad consensus and the flexibility provided for implementation.  
4. Conclusions 
Resilience is not only a technical issue, it is also a political issue. From a political perspective, resilience is often 
a win-lose game with many uncertainties and will therefor evoke social and political resistance. From a technical 
perspective, a systems approach is needed. However, from a political perspective a systems approach results in very 
complex decision making processes.  
The Dutch ‘Room for the River’-project was based upon the idea of resilience. It was perceived as high risk 
political decision making, given the many potential win-lose situations, the many actors involved with their 
conflicting interests and the many uncertainties. 
The main strategy of the vice-minister had two components: broadening the agenda and changing this project 
from a one issue game to a multi-issue game. This created incentives for the actors to work together and to link the 
‘Room for the River’ measures to their own interests. They no longer had an interest in challenging the information 
provided by the experts. It also changed the role of experts: their focus was less on explaining the need for these 
measures and the impact of these measures – and more on facilitating the decision making process and giving room 
to the decision makers. 
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